This paper uses French data on ideal body weight and food attitudes to investigate the role of social norms in the consumer's weight control problem. A proxy measure of social norms is constructed by averaging individual perceptions of ideal body mass index (BMI) over all observations in a reference-group. Testing for di¤erent de…nitions of the referencegroup, we …nd that individual representations of ideal body shape are di¤erentiated mainly along gender and age lines. Social norms on body shape have a signi…cant e¤ect on perceptions of ideal BMI for those women who want to slim down, with an elasticity close to 0.5. For many women and for all men, ideal BMI is not a¤ected by social norms, but almost exclusively determined by habitual BMI. Since ideal BMI predicts a number of attitudes toward food, perspectives on the obesity epidemic should take into consideration the habituation e¤ect produced by habitual BMI on ideal BMI.
Introduction
Trends in body mass have recently become a major health concern for France. In 2002, 37.5% of French adults aged over 15 were overweight against 29.7% in 1990 (OECD Health Data 2005). The medical cost of obesity was already 1 billion euros in 1991 (Detournay et al., 2000) . 1 This suggests an obvious arena for policy intervention through taxes, subsidies and information. However, calibrating public intervention requires that social interactions in the consumer's weight control problem be identi…ed, because they induce social multiplier e¤ects (Clark and Oswald, 1998) . In this perspective, this paper investigates global interactions through social norms.
Investigating the role of social norms requires that reference-groups be appropriately de…ned, and that a measure of social norms in these groups be constructed. As a starting point, this paper de…nes the reference-groups on the basis of gender, birth cohorts and occupation groups. The economics of social interaction often posits that norms act through individual expectations of average behaviour. Here, the "behaviour" under scrutiny is an outcome measure: the Body Mass Index (BMI). The BMI is a good predictor of overweight-related morbidity. By adjusting weight for height, it gives a more precise picture of individual's body shape than body weight alone, and arguably takes into consideration both medical and aesthetic concerns with body weight. Following the traditional approach, the mean reference-group BMI could then be considered as a proxy for social norms. This paper takes another route by assuming that social norms a¤ect subjective perceptions of ideal BMI, which in turn in ‡uence food choices and ultimately actual BMI. It uses the French survey "Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages 2001", which covers roughly 10 000 people in 5000 households. This data set contains a detailed health interview of one person in each household with information on actual body weight and height, as well as a measure of ideal body weight. Using …ndings from social psychology, we argue that averaging ideal BMI over all observations in each reference-group yields a proxy measure of social norms on body shape.
The theoretical framework is a model wherein utility is a function of weight satisfaction. A key assumption is that ideal BMI maximises weight satisfaction, which is speci…ed as a function of social norms, an idiosyncratic bliss point, and the individual's habitual weight. The latter captures the adjustment costs that individuals face when they want to slim down. The model yields two predictions that guide the empirical analysis.
First, individuals with high marginal adjustment costs around habitual weight are more likely to declare their habitual weight as ideal. Absent good measures of marginal adjustment costs, this prediction is not testable. Nevertheless, for about 40% of the sample, actual and ideal BMI are equals. As such, actual BMI should be a good proxy for habitual BMI.
Second, for individuals with low marginal adjustment costs around habitual weight, both social norms and habitual BMI a¤ect ideal BMI. Those individuals who would like to gain weight (6% of the sample) are more likely to have speci…c health conditions, so that we ignore them. For the remaining 50% -those individuals who want to slim down -, we estimate a linear equation that speci…es ideal BMI as a function of social norms, habitual BMI (proxied by actual BMI) and individual characteristics. As actual BMI and social norms are likely to be endogenous, we identify their e¤ect by an instrumental variable method, using the average ideal BMI of adjacent birth cohorts, years of schooling and arealevel indicators as instruments. In the estimation subsample, the elasticities of individual ideal BMI to social norms and to habitual BMI are respectively about +0.5 and +0.5 for women, and 0 and +0.8 for men. These are upper and lower bounds for the whole sample, and they are quite sensitive to the choice of the instrument set and the de…nition of the reference-groups. Regarding the latter, we …nd that individual representations of ideal body shape are di¤erentiated mainly along gender and age lines. Occupation, education or other stratifying variables matter less.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 recalls some key …ndings and de…nitions from the literature on obesity and social norms. Section 3 presents the data on ideal and actual BMIs, and constructs a measure of social norms. Section 4 exposes the economic model. Section 5 proposes an econometric speci…cation and outlines the identi…cation issues. Our main …ndings are reported in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Body shape and social norms. Philipson and Posner, 1999 ). Yet, considering available empirical results, a large part of the individual variance remains unexplained. Before appealing to idiosyncratic factors such as genes or personality traits, it is worth asking whether an analysis of social interactions can provide additional insights into the etiology of the epidemic. Burke and Heiland (2005) have recently argued that social norms may explain some aspects of the dynamics of the BMI distribution, in particular its increasing skewness. The key argument is that social norms act as a social multiplier if, at time t, they depend on some moment of the BMI distribution at time t 1 (for instance the mean or the median). Hence, a price decrease has a direct positive e¤ect on calorie intakes, which moves the BMI distribution towards the right; if this causes an increase in the social norms, then the cost of over-eating is reduced, and individuals face fewer incentives to control their calorie intakes. The direct e¤ect of a price increase is therefore multiplied in the presence of social norms, especially for those individuals in the right-tail of the distribution because they are more prone to lack of self-control.
One solution for identifying the e¤ect of social norms is the observation of sanctions. For instance, Averett and Korenman (1996) and Cawley (2004) …nd signi…cant di¤erences in economic status for white obese women in America. Using French data, Paraponaris et al. (2005) suggest that time spent in an unemployment spell is positively correlated with the body mass index. However, this demand for standardized body shapes may arise from expectations interactions (Manski, 2000) . Various experiments have shown that overweight is considered by recruiters and supervisors as a signal for unobservable predispositions, such as laziness, lack of self-control, a higher probability of illness etc. As long as these defaults are believed to be negatively correlated with productivity, an informational discrimination can arise, especially in the race for job positions that require self-control, dynamism, and leadership. 2 Expectations interactions may also explain the emergence of standards of thinness. New markets have developed upon the ideal of thinness, which has largely di¤used in the western middle and upper classes after World War II. The high division of labour in the sector of entertainment renders possible for individuals from lower social classes to succeed, even if they have no other capital than their body. Last, the medicalisation of obesity has also led individuals to consider their weight as a risk factor for health. One standard prediction of the health demand model is that individuals with higher lifecycle wage pro…les have higher incentives to remain healthy: sticking to the medical standards of thinness is a health investment. These examples emphasises that, facing the same constraints, either in terms of body characteristics demanded on the labour market, or in terms of returns to health investments, individuals are likely to have similar perceptions of ideal body weight. Following Manski (1993) , this is a correlated e¤ect, which produces standards of behaviours rather than social norms. However, a number of sociologists consider that, in the long run, external constraints are internalized by individuals, in the sense that they induce institutionalized role expectations that are sustained by reactions of the group's members (Horne, 2001 ). Using Manski's terminology, it means that norms emerge from preference interactions with 'signi…cant'others. As such, norms produce endogenous e¤ects, which generate a social multiplier while correlated e¤ects do not. Disentangling endogenous e¤ects from correlated e¤ects is important in a public policy perspective and poses substantial identi…cation problems.
Data
To explore the relationship between social norms and body shape, we employ data from the survey "Enquête Permanente sur les Conditions de Vie des Mé-nages" EPCV2001), which was carried out by the INSEE (the French national statistical agency) in 2001. It contains information at both the household and the individual levels, and one randomly-drawn individual in each household answered a detailed health questionnaire. The starting sample consists of 5194 individuals in the same number of households. Given the presence of missing values, 3538 individuals are kept for the analysis. All variables are presented with descriptive statistics in Table A1 , Appendix A.
Ideal and actual BMIs in the data
Height and actual body weight are self-declared. 3 Our measure of ideal BMI is A comparison of the two distributions with relative distribution methods reveals both a location-and a shape-shift (see Contoyannis and Wildman, 2006 , for a thorough presentation of these methods). The graph in the left frame of Figure A2 compares the BMI distribution (taken as the reference) and the distribution that would have the same shape but the median of the ideal BMI's distribution. The solid line, which represents the relative distribution, is clearly downward sloping. For almost all percentile positions r of the reference distribution the proportion of observations in the comparison distribution is higher than r: there is a negative location shift. For 39% of the sample actual and ideal body weights are equal; more than 55% of the sample would like to slim down; the remaining 6% want to gain weight. Among these latter, one individ-ual is medically overweight (BMI>25) and 69.3% meet the medical standards (18.5 BMI<25). These individuals are also more likely to have peculiar characteristics. For instance, they are more prone to mental disorders and negative a¤ects: 19% of them take a psychiatric treatment against 14% in the whole sample, 25% feel lonely (vs. 15%), etc. We will ignore them in the empirical analysis.
The graph in the right frame compares the distribution of actual BMI adjusted for location (the reference) and the distribution of ideal BMI. There are fewer observations in the latter than in the former for all percentile positions lower than 0.2 or higher than the 0.8: both tails of the actual BMI's distribution are denser and there is less dispersion in ideal BMI than in actual BMI. Almost 50% of those individuals who meet the medical standards are satis…ed with their weight. This is the case for 25.3% of the overweight (25 BMI<30) and 12.6% of the obese (30 BMI) individuals. Most obese (87.4%) and overweight individuals (74.6%) would like to slim down (against 42% of those in the [18.5;25] range). Almost 47% of those individuals who are under the medical threshold of thinness (BMI<18.5) would like to gain weight while 46% of them are satis…ed. Hence, there is a positive concordance between the deviation from the medical standards and weight satisfaction, which is rather good news for public health policies.
Measuring social norms
Identifying the e¤ect of social norm requires …rst that reference-groups be appropriately de…ned. Norms are enforced through social interactions, and the costs and consequences of interactions are generally lower the closer are individuals in social space (Horne, 2001; Akerlof, 1997) . Parents, friends, work colleagues, and geographic neighbours may participate to the enforcement of norms on body shape. These 'signi…cant'others should not be confounded with the reference-group, who is made of 'similar'others. 4 Norms on body shape are actually sustained by a social comparison process which necessarily takes into consideration biological constraints. As such, age and gender should obviously characterise the reference-group. Similar others may also be those who share the same occupation, have the same education or lives in the neighbourhood. At this point, following Manski (1993) , it is worth having some a priori. The French sociological research suggests that occupation is the key factor that drives social di¤erentiation in body shapes and food habits (Bourdieu, 1979; Grignon and Grignon, 1999; Regnier, 2006) . As a consequence, we assume that individuals are similar to each other if : (i) they are of same sex; (ii) they have no more than 5 years of age di¤erence; (iii) they belong to similar or close occupation groups. This choice is extensively discussed in Section 7.
The presence of material sanctions (via for instance the labour and the marriage markets) is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition for the existence of social norms. As noted by Elster (1989) , social norms are "sustained by the feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person su¤ers at the prospect of violating them". Some psychological studies have found that these feelings are associated with the discrepancies between the representations of attributes individuals actually possess and the attributes they would like to possess and 'signi…cant' others believe they ought to possess (see for instance Tangney et al., 1998) . Hence, ideal BMI is a measure of both individual aspirations and what ought to be. Since "the most common element [in the de…nitions of social norms] is oughtness -an expectation that is shared by the members of some group." (Hechter and Opp, 2001 , p. 403), averaging ideal BMI in each reference-group produces a proxy measure of how the individual believe s/he ought to be, given one's group membership (see Stutzer and Lalive, 2004 , for a similar approach). We use a geometric average instead of an arithmetic average for three reasons. First, a geometric average is less sensitive to extreme values as long as the variable takes values bounded away from zero. Since our measure is computed from the data, the reference-groups are small, and we do not want to put too much weight on outliers. Second, if ideal BMI were log-normal, its median could be estimated by a geometric average. From a normative point of view, as a norm should aggregate a majority of individual preferences, a medianvoter argument may apply. 5 Third, in the empirical analysis we will regress the logarithm of ideal BMI on the logarithm of the social norm. De…ning the latter as a geometric average makes our model resemble the traditional linear-in-means model of the social interactions literature.
Model
This section proposes an economic model of weight satisfaction, in order to guide our empirical analysis of the relationship between social norms, ideal BMI and food attitudes.
Weight satisfaction
The economic setting is a model, wherein individual utility U (:) is separable into weight satisfaction, W S(W ), and satisfaction from food F and a numeraire m, CS(F; m). The consumption goods a¤ect BMI W , through a weight production equation. Given a static income constraint F F + m = I, where I is income, the consumer's weight control problem is:
Weight satisfaction is speci…ed as the sum of loss functions, which increase in the di¤erences between W and three reference point: a social norm W g sustained by preference interactions; habitual weight W h , which induces costs of adjustment; an idiosyncratic bliss point W p .
The social cost of deviation from the norm is captured by the sub-utility v(W ; W g ). A key assumption is that W and W g are complementary in v(:), so that utility is comparison-concave, and its concavity depends on the marginal cost of deviating from the reference point (Clark and Oswald, 1998). As in Akerlof (1997), we consider a quadratic speci…cation:
where g is positive and might be speci…c to the individual's reference-group g.
Loosing weight is not easy, mainly because body weight is produced by a set of consumption habits that condition current consumer choices (foodways and exercise essentially). Hypo-caloric slimming diets have also speci…c cognitive costs. During moments of high-awareness, dieters generally avoid answering to their basic caloric needs (as signalled by the sensations of hunger and satiety). In this case, the body interprets calorie restrictions as a threat, protects its fat reserves, and sends signals that induce losses of control especially during moments of low awareness. Maintaining awareness has a cost, as well as lack of self-control because it damages self-esteem (Heatherton et al., 1993 , Basdevant, 1998 , Herman and Polivy, 2003 . We introduce a quadratic adjustment cost function (:) :
The main characteristics of adjustment costs is that their right and left …rst derivatives may not be continuous at the habitual weight level W h : 
Note that p is positive.
and given that the sub-utilities are quadratic, one may equally specify W S(W ) as:
with:
where 1 fW W h g equals 1 if W W h and 0 otherwise.
Ideal body weight
Suppose now that ideal BMI W maximises weight satisfaction. Let
shown that: 
One has necessarily
then the marginal cost of slimming is greater than the marginal bene…t of conformity so that ideal BMI is simply habitual BMI:
The model yields three predictions. First, ideal and habitual BMIs should be equal for those individuals with high marginal adjustment costs around habitual weight. Second, equation (5) is a measurement equation that links ideal BMI to social norms and habitual BMI for all those whose habitual and ideal BMI di¤er. Third, assuming without loss of generality that U = CS + W S, the …rst-order condition with respect to food consumption F is:
Imagine that food consumption is measured in calories. Then, the full price of energy intakes is higher than the market price for those whose actual weight is higher than f W . Their diet should be less caloric. 6 5 Econometric speci…cation
A linear-in-means model
The selection condition (
) and equation (6) form a structural model that is not identi…able without a good measure of W p t Nevertheless, the …rst prediction suggests that actual BMI is a good proxy for habitual BMI, because ideal and actual BMIs are equal for about 40% of the sample. 7 Hence, we may assume that W h = W: Then W < W = W h implies that W = f W as in equation (6) . The latter provides a starting point for specifying the relationship between ideal BMI and social norms in the subsample of those individuals who would like to slim down: this will be our estimation sample, whose descriptive statistics are presented in Table A1 . of Appendix A. For them:
The key implication of the model is that regressions will have to control for W , which proxies habitual weight, in order to estimate correctly social norms e¤ect. Note also that, ceteris paribus, the lower is p , the less likely is the
to hold. Hence, estimating 6 All predictions holds under one regularity condition: adjustment costs must not be downward sloping for all W < W h . Hence,
should not be too negative. This condition also implies that S is positive in equation (6) . 7 Another obvious reason is that there are measurement errors ('heaping' e¤ects for instance) in answers about ideal body weight. (8) in the selected subsample yields an upper bound for the social norms e¤ect in the whole sample.
For the empirical analysis, it is supposed that the variables W , W and W g are logarithms of actual BMI, ideal BMI and social norms. Let Q be the vector of variables that de…ne group membership (age, gender and occupation), and (Q) the corresponding interaction dummy. E(W j (Q) = g) is our measure of W g for the reference-group g, since it is a logarithm of a geometric average (see Section 3). For each individual i, W g is estimated by averaging W over the group of similar others R i . To this end, we construct a N N spatial weights matrix D, which speci…es for each observation i the set of similar others. This is a matrix of 0 and 1, such that d ij = 1 if i and j are similar and d ii = 0.
We standardize the elements of this matrix by we have to impose the restriction that 8g; g = and g = in equation (8) .
The idiosyncratic reference point W p is a function of observable and unobservable individual characteristics. Let H represents individual variables that could a¤ect perceptions of ideal body shape (such as income, area of residence, marital status etc.); E(Hj (Q)) are contextual e¤ects, whereby individuals have similar perceptions due to average within-group observable characteristics. 9 We assume that:
where H includes the constant and i is an error-term with mean zero that captures unobservable individual e¤ects. The econometric counterpart of equation (8) is :
When is correlated with (Q) (E( j (Q)) 6 = 0), there are correlated effects, whereby agents in the same group behave similarly because they have "similar unobserved characteristics or face similar institutional environments" 8 When the reference-groups are de…ned as in Section 3, social norms are computed using 4229 observations. The sample of 3538 individuals used to compute the descriptive statistics was obtained by dropping individuals with missing values to questions about food attitudes. Reference-groups with less than 15 individuals are dropped from the regressions. 9 Imagine for instance that there is some segregation by social group on the marriage market. Then, ideal body weight in this group may depend on the average rate of singles, which determines somewhat how competitive is the group-speci…c marriage market. (Manski, 1993) . Common representations of ideal body shape generate correlated e¤ects when they are produced by external economic constraints that are not internalized by individuals as preference parameters (see Section 2).
Identi…cation issues
Speci…cation (9) raises several identi…cation issues (cf. the discussion in Manski, 1993). First, taking expectations of (9) with respect to (Q) reveals that DW = E(W j (Q)) is a function of E(Hj (Q)) (and E( j (Q)) if there are correlated e¤ects). These variables are collinear and the e¤ect of E(W j (Q)) is not identi…able without further assumptions. As it is often the case in models of social interactions, we assume that there are no contextual e¤ects:
= 0. The model becomes:
Second, the model is identi…ed if E( j (Q)) = 0 (no correlated e¤ects). As this is unlikely to be the case (at least because contextual e¤ects are omitted), we have to instrumentŴ g = DW = E(W j (Q)). Actual weight may also be endogenous (E( jW ) 6 = 0), because unobservable individual characteristics such as tendencies to eating disorders can simultaneously a¤ect ideal BMI and actual BMI.
As a consequence, equation (10) is estimated by a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that exploits the orthogonality conditions between the residuals and a set of instruments. The latter includes the social norms of adjacent reference-groups (following Grodner and Kniesner, 2006 ). More precisely, consider an individual i of age A i . All individuals j, with age A j such that A i 5 A j < A i belong to the reference-group of i, R i . Then, same-sex and -occupation individuals k such that A j 5 A k < A i 5 belong to R j , but not to R i . Averaging social norms over these individuals k produces a variable W g that should be correlated with the ideal BMI of individuals j, and therefore with i's social norm. Conditionally on the latter, W g should not be correlated with W . Symmetrically, one can construct W g+ by using individuals k such that A i + 5 A k < A j + 5 for all js in R i . According to (10) current actual BMI may in ‡uence future ideal BMI. Hence, we expect W g+ to be correlated with
We also use two area-based instruments in an attempt to summarise local factors (prices, quality of food supply, deprivation etc.) that may a¤ect actual BMI. These variables are the mean prevalence of obesity (M OBESE) and dental problems (M DEN T S) across individuals living in the same or adjacent department, and the same or close types of residential area. 10 The mean prevalence of obesity is estimated from the data (using all available information), while the mean prevalence of dental problems is estimated from the …ve yearly surveys "Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages 1996-2000". These instruments should not be correlated with ideal BMI conditionally on actual BMI. This may also be the case for years of schooling (Y RSCHOOL, computed using the OECD's equivalence scale for the French education levels).
For the identi…cation to be robust, the instruments must be strongly correlated with social norms and actual BMI, conditionally on the other variables that a¤ect ideal BMI. We test the weakness of the instruments using the CraggDonald statistics (CD) as suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) . Under a normality assumption, this statistics generalises the F-statistics from the …rst-stage regression when there are more than one endogenous variable. Conservative critical values are computed by Stock and Yogo under the null that the instruments are weak. We also use an Anderson-Rubin statistics (AR), which tests the null that the instruments are jointly not signi…cant in a reduced form version of (10) wherein they replace the endogenous regressors. Last, we always use more than two instruments. As such, the model is over-identi…ed and the over-identifying restrictions are tested by the Hansen test. The regressions use the instrument sets that maximise CD and AR and minimise Hansen statistics.
Results
Central to this paper is the idea that social norms do not a¤ect behaviours directly, but through individual perceptions. Actually, following equation (7), we should observe a positive correlation between (W W ) and healthy food attitudes for those individuals who want to slim down (since for them W = f W ). The converse should be true for those who want to gain weight. Before estimating equation (10), we show that the di¤erence between actual and ideal BMIs predicts a number of attitudes towards food.
Ideal body weight as a predictor of food attitudes
The data contains information on some consumer's attitudes and behaviours: the perception of diet quality (4 levels), the frequency of consumption of light products, the restrictions on food products motivated by concerns with their fat or sugar content, the last day consumptions of carbohydrate drinks and alcohol, and exercise frequency (see Table A1 in Appendix A). Controlling for a number of variables (income, education, age, sex, occupation and localisation), we estimate probit and ordered probit models of the attitude variables as functions of six explanatory variables: W , the logarithm of height, social norms, DIF F N EG and DIF F P OS. These last two variables intend to capture asymmetric e¤ects of deviations from ideal BMI:
DIF F P OS = 1 fW <W g (W W ) Table B1 in Appendix B reports the results. Given actual BMI, unsatisfaction with BMI is positively correlated with feelings of having an unhealthy diet (see the coe¢ cient on DIF F P OS). Those who feel overweight are more likely to declare restrictions, consume more often light or sugar-free products. Their last day consumption of sodas and alcohol is lower. Opposite or insignificant results are found for those who are satis…ed with their weight or feels underweight. Interestingly, they are no signi…cant correlations between weight satisfaction and exercise.
These results suggest that ideal BMI captures information about individual preferences that are not captured by actual BMI. Moreover, given weight satisfaction and actual weight, there are few correlation with social norms. These are suggestive evidence that social norms may a¤ect behaviours, but only indirectly, through individual perceptions. Table B2 in Appendix B reports the main results. The econometric method is indicated in the …rst row. 11 The coe¢ cients on social norms or actual BMI are elasticities.
The e¤ect of social norms on ideal body weight
The …rst column (OLS / 1) produces OLS results from a speci…cation, which controls only for the H variables. Men have an higher ideal BMI than women (+11%), as expected, and the age e¤ect is increasing concave. The occupation dummies are generally not signi…cant, but lower social classes and farmers seem to have an higher ideal BMI than executives. There is also a negative education e¤ect, which disappears when actual BMI is introduced, as is shown by the OLS results in the second column (OLS / 2). This speci…cation also controls for social norms. Here, the gender e¤ect is weaker, the age e¤ect is no more signi…cant, and the social gradient is somewhat reversed. The elasticity of ideal BMI to social norms is positive, low but signi…cant (+0.14), while the elasticity to actual BMI is rather high (+0.64)
The age trend and the sex and occupation dummies are dropped in the third speci…cation, which is estimated by GMM using Y RSCHOOL, M DEN T S, W g and W g+ as instruments (GMM/3). As shown by the p-value of the AR statistics, the model is not underidenti…ed in the sense that, absent controls for social norms and actual BMI, the instrument set is signi…cantly correlated with ideal BMI. The p-value of the Hansen's over-identi…cation test is correct, although not very high. Perhaps more worrying is the CD statistics of 4.3. According to Stock and Yogo (2002 , Table 1 ), this corresponds to a bias of the GMM estimator relative to OLS of about 30%. GMM do better than OLS but the results are still biased. The elasticity to social norms is much higher than in OLS/2 (+0.73), while the e¤ect of actual BMI is cut by half (+0.27).
The fourth speci…cation drops actual BMI (GMM/4). Here, all the tests pass largely. As such, the problem of weak identi…cation encountered in speci…cation GMM/3 was generated by a lack of strong instruments for actual BMI. Note also that speci…cation GMM/4 is open to the "tautological identi…cation" criticism (Manski, 1993 , section 2.4). Actual BMI being excluded, there are no individual control variables that are signi…cantly correlated with ideal BMI. Hence, this fourth speci…cation can be thought of as a regression of ideal BMI on its mean, and it is not surprising to …nd an elasticity close to 1.
The …fth speci…cation adds to speci…cation 3 controls for age, gender and occupation as in column 1 (GMM/5). Here we try to identify the impact of the variables Q; by relying on non-linearities between some control function f (Q) for the e¤ects of Q, and E(W j (Q)). The elasticities are quite similar to those found in OLS/2, but the CD statistics clearly shows that identi…cation is not robust.
Individual perceptions seem to be a weighted average of the social norm and the actual BMI, with respective coe¢ cients of 0.7 and 0.3. Individual characteristics play a minor role here, because actual BMI captures most of their in ‡uence. However, we …nd a signi…cant negative e¤ect of single-parenthood: in any given social group, single-parents have a lower ideal body weight. One appealing explanation is in terms of value on the re-marriage market: thinness may compensate for the presence of children.
Discussion
We have found a remarkably high elasticity of ideal BMI to the social norm (about 0.7). But this is clearly an upper bound for the true elasticity in the whole population, because only the subsample of individuals for which, according to the model, social norms matter, was selected. The structural model implies that the elasticity is 0 for those with high marginal adjustment costs.
One may also wonder whether the e¤ect of social norms varies by gender and how sensitive it is to the de…nition of the reference-group. Table B3 presents estimation results of our preferred speci…cation (GMM/3) for men and women separately. It tests various de…nitions of the referencegroup. For each de…nition, the coe¢ cients of interest are displayed in the …rst and second rows. The test statistics are reported in the next three rows. The number of observations and the instrument set are found in the last two rows. 12 The benchmark results are reported in the upper part of the Table, for reference-groups that comprise same sex and same occupation individuals with less than 5 years of age di¤erence. Perhaps the most striking result is that the elasticity to social norms is about +0.7 for women, and negative but not signi…cant for men. For women, the results are more robust than previously, since the CD statistics show that the bias of GMM relative to OLS is about 20%. There is clearly an important problem of weak identi…cation in the men subsample. The estimates do not change sensitively when the maximum age di¤erence goes from 2, to 5, and eventually 10 years (see the …rst and second rows in the upper part of the Table) . There is more variations for men, but the Hansen statistics rejects the overidentifying restrictions (p-value: 2e 4 ) when the maximum age di¤erence is set to two years. We then model the social strati…cation by seven education levels instead of twelve occupation groups. 13 The results reported in the middle part of Table   B3 show little changes, which means that education and occupation are interchangeable indicators. Actually, does the socioeconomic strati…cation matter at all? The lower part of the Table presents our most robust results. The referencegroup is de…ned on the basis of age and gender only. As previously, the elasticity to social norms is not signi…cant for men, but somewhat lower for women (+0.52). All test statistics are satisfying. In particular, the CD statistics for women is around 8.5, which means that the bias of GMM relative to OLS is lower than 10%. The CD statistics for men is close to 5.2, so that the relative bias is about 20%.
The sensitivity analysis has shown that the de…nition of the reference-group is a key assumption in any study that aims at quantifying the role of social norms. It also suggests that the representations of ideal body shape (for oneself) are structured mainly along gender and age lines. Socioeconomic frontiers matter less.
Conclusion
One of the major objectives of public health policy over recent years has been to reduce the prevalence of overweight and obesity. It has been suggested that taxes and subsidies to food products, as well as the dissemination of information and nutritional labelling may help to achieve this objective. In this perspective, assessing the role of social norms on body shape is crucial, since they act as social multipliers of public policies'e¤ects. Our intuition was that social norms can be thought of as social interactions that are mediated by individual representations of ideal body shape.
We …nd that weight satisfaction is signi…cantly correlated with a number of attitudes toward food, with the expected signs. There are few direct correlations between food attitudes and our measure of social norms. This suggests that social norms act on consumption behaviours not directly, but indirectly, by modifying individual aspirations. Social norms have a signi…cant e¤ect on individual representations of ideal body shapes for the women who want to slim down. The elasticity of ideal BMI to social norms is between 0.5 and 0.75. If there were some inertia in social norms, then such elasticities would be good news. However, this result is an upper bound. Men do not seem sensible to social norms. Further, the elasticity of ideal BMI to habitual BMI is at least 0.3 for women, and higher than 0.8 for men. Habituation of individual representations to the reality is important and, in …ne, moves social norms upward. These …ndings have two consequences. First, the autocorrelation of ideal BMI in social groups is mainly due to correlated e¤ects rather than to endogenous e¤ects. Second, the social multiplier e¤ect plays a minor role compared to the habituation e¤ect, whereby an agent's aspirations for one's own weight adapt to one's habitual weight.
As noted by Manski (1993) , working on global interactions in large referencegroup hinges heavily upon a priori about the group of "similar" others. While age and gender are important strati…ers, this is not the case for the socioeconomic indicators. This suggests two directions for future research. First, individuals may base their representations on role models (pop-stars, sport players etc.). This is known for teenagers, but there are only scarce evidence for adults and ethnographic studies may be helpful. Second, studies of interactions in small groups lack. Since it has been found for smoking that interactions in small groups (peer e¤ects) are often low, we may wonder whether it is the same for the consumer's weight control problem. 
Appendix A. Descriptive statistics

